Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20510

November 9, 2026

The Honorable Howard Lutnick
Secretary of Commerce
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20230

Dear Secretary Lutnick,

We call on the Department of Commerce to immediately halt exports of advanced artificial intelligence chips to the People's Republic of China (PRC) amid recent reporting about PRC intelligence activities and of potential PRC access to these critical national security technologies. You cannot claim to be protecting American leadership in artificial intelligence while allowing our most advanced technology to reach a strategic competitor. National security must come before corporate sales targets.

As we previously warned, allowing China to obtain advanced U.S. AI chips puts our national security at risk.[1] These chips power the computing capabilities that will shape the future of artificial intelligence, military modernization, and economic competition. Once these capabilities reach the PRC government or entities acting on its behalf, the consequences could be nearly impossible to reverse.

The *New York Times* reported last week that U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Alice Huang, a former executive at Megaspeed, was an asset of Beijing's Minister of State Security and sought to influence U.S. policy on advanced chip exports.[2] The *Financial Times* subsequently reported that intelligence officials shared an assessment concerning Huang with a small group of senior U.S. officials earlier this year[3] and the *New York Times* reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio oversaw the drafting of this assessment and shared it with high level administration officials.[4] Separately, *Bloomberg* has documented serious questions about Megaspeed's chip purchases, business relationships, and potential role in providing PRC companies access to advanced computing capacity through Southeast Asia.[5]

Most recently, the *New York Times* reported that the Department of Commerce had approved licenses for advanced AI chips to several PRC companies with questionable ties to the PRC government.[6] Despite the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) completing reviews of these

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[1] https://amo.house.gov/press-release/amo-meeks-challenge-trump-secretary-lutnick-plan-to-sell-advanced-ai-chips-to-china
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/06/us/politics/chinese-spy-agency-nvidia-jensen-huang.html
[3] https://www.ft.com/content/a55a2a22-4479-4f93-a445-6147a5c6d790?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/08/us/politics/rubio-nvidia-ceo-chinese-spy.html
[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-12-22/nvidia-partner-megaspeed-draws-china-chip-smuggling-concerns-in-us
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/07/business/economy/nvidia-chips-chinese-firms.html

companies for national security risks before approving the licenses, the *New York Times* found that there was little evidence that one of these companies, New Matrix, actually exists. New Matrix lists its address at an empty building with no record of the company. Its owners have ties to a PRC private equity fund Wise Road on a U.S. government trade blacklist, raising questions as to whether New Matrix is simply a front for Wise Road. The *New York Times* found that New Matrix was not an outlier. Many other companies approved to receive advanced AI chips had connections to firms on U.S. trade blacklists or had ties to the PRC military.[7]

Considering these alarming reports, the American people must have transparency into what your Department knew, when it knew it, and why it continued to permit these exports. We request written answers to the following questions no later than December 1, 2026:

1. Were you, Under Secretary for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler, or other senior Commerce and BIS officials aware of intelligence linking Alice Huang and Megaspeed to PRC efforts to obtain advanced Nvidia chips? Please identify the date, participants, and substance of each briefing.

2. Did you, Under Secretary for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler, or other senior Commerce and BIS officials communicate with Secretary of State Marco Rubio or a member of his staff regarding Alice Huang, Megaspeed, or its affiliates? If so, please specify the date and information shared.

3. Did the intelligence community or any other federal agency recommend that Commerce investigate, suspend, or restrict exports to Megaspeed or its affiliates? If so, what action did the Department take in response?

4. Has BIS approved exports of Nvidia Blackwell chips or other advanced AI chips to Megaspeed, its affiliates, or entities operating its data centers? If so, please identify the recipients, quantities, and dates of approval and exports.

5. What due diligence has BIS conducted into Megaspeed's ownership, customers, business relationships, and end users? Has the Department determined whether PRC companies can access computing capacity powered by these chips?

6. What licensing, reporting, and end-use verification requirements currently apply to advanced AI chip exports to Southeast Asian countries? How does BIS prevent PRC entities from accessing restricted computing capacity through third-country data centers?

7. What due diligence has BIS conducted into New Matrix?

8. What additional safeguards, if any, has BIS implemented to ensure that the companies they are evaluating are not and will not use the chips in violation of BIS's end-use prohibitions?

9. What additional safeguards, if any, has the Department implemented to ensure that decisions to approve advanced chip exports reflect national-security assessments and not simply the commercial interests of U.S. technology companies?

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/07/business/economy/nvidia-chips-chinese-firms.html

We hope that the Department did not ignore warnings about a suspected PRC intelligence operation while allowing advanced American technology to flow through companies under scrutiny. If Commerce was not briefed, we need to know why. If it was briefed, we need to know how it responded. And if the Department knowingly permitted these exports despite credible national-security concerns, the American people deserve an explanation.

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. We expect a prompt and complete response.

Sincerely,

GABE AMO
Vice Ranking Member

GREGORY W. MEEKS
Ranking Member

SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE
Ranking Member
South and Central Asia Subcommittee

CC: Secretary of State Marco Rubio